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When the first economics departments were proposed at Cambridge and Oxford, the
proponents thought acceptance would be improved if economics could be seen as
incorporating the methods of physics.  The enterprise was premised on the existence of
economic laws that describe invariant relationships between events.  These event
regularities, like gravity, were not affected by human action.  Humans could adapt and use
them, but not change them.  Thus the metaphor of “mechanism” seemed appropriate and
became embedded in economists’ language.  It is common to use the term market
mechanism to link prices and commodities. This suggests the economy is like turning a
crank attached to a set of gears where there is a fixed relationship between the crank’s
motion and the last gear’s motion.  The gears have no ideas of their own, they don’t get
mad; there is no cognitive element between events and action. 
But what if the economic world is not entirely like that?  Tony Lawson (1997)
argues that event regularities in economics are rare.  There are only “demi-regs” limited to
time and space.  People learn and change the links between events.  Preferences are not
fixed.  Event regularity presumes a closed system, while human affairs are open systems
where the conjunctions among events are partly human artifacts.  These artifacts are
formed by human intent based on observation of real events.  
Ontology is the theory of what is real, of what exists. Lawson is explicitly
concerned with ontology because any set of assumptions about what is real fits some
methodologies, but not others. Traditionally focused on questions such as the existence of
God and the angels, ontology became central to philosophy of science in the early 20
th
century (see Appendix).  Positivists asserted that only data are real; underlying causes and
ordinary objects (things like cows, pigs and bushels of wheat) are not. On the positivist
view, science identifies patterns of regularity in data. But how can such a view of science1
support predictions about the supply or demand of cows, pigs and bushels of wheat? To
make predictions one must (and economists who were influenced by positivism did)
interpret patterns in data as invariant laws, as relationships that apply universally to all
data. In many instances, this strategy led economists to make serviceable predictions, but
positivism ruled out any interest in the underlying causes, structures, powers, processes
and tendencies that are responsible for observed regularities. Lawson’s philosophy of
science (which he calls critical realism) presumes that some sort of deeper cause is real,
and that forces such as gravity or social structure have real effects (see also Bhaskar).
2 
Lawson makes three related points in favor of critical realism and against
positivism. The first is that positivism has led economists to neglect topics that are of clear
relevance to the behavior of economic agents and economic systems. In simply presuming
that observed data can be described by universal quantitative relationships, positive
economists make an ontological assumption that blinds them to important sources of
dynamism in an economy—sources such as human intention, knowledge and emotion.
Second, he argues that the underlying realities shaping economic behavior are highly2
variable, and may be relatively short-lived. Positive economists seeking universal laws
have been enamored with quantitative models. Lawson (p. 70) argues that
“Econometricians continually puzzle over why it is that ‘estimated relationships’
repeatedly ‘break down’, usually as soon as new observations become available.”  Finally,
he argues that error is best attributed to inadequate knowledge of underlying causes or
structures. Since knowledge itself is an underlying cause that affects social structure, it is
impossible to eliminate error entirely. As such, knowledge is always contingent and subject
to revision. Positivists, on the other hand, adopted an epistemology based on certainty.
When one truly knows the invariant quantitative relations implicit in every set of data, any
given set of observations provides the basis for logically certain predictions about future
observations.
Hausman (p. 208-9) writes that everyone is a realist in one form or another. The
disagreement is over what reality is and whether to pursue deep causes. Should applied
economists pursue these causes? Is the proof in the pudding? How has economics been
doing? If you are completely happy with the progress of economic knowledge, you can
stop reading now. If not, then Lawson may have something to offer.
 
Implications for Economic Practice
All of us remember Friedman’s dictum that the realism of assumptions is irrelevant
as long as the model predicts.  A realist such as Lawson objects.  Friedman must assume
the existence of spontaneously occurring closed systems.  All models are partial and
abstract by definition.  But, Lawson argues that an appropriate abstraction must be
concerned with real, not idealized processes; and must be concerned with the essential
rather than merely the most general attributes of things.
In experimental designs with randomization it is not necessary to understand what
variables might be controlled by the randomization.  Randomization means that whatever
else might affect Y is held constant.  So if we vary X and find it associated with change in
Y, we are confident in saying that we have discovered some event regularity of the form
“If X, then Y.”  The other variables, whatever they are, have been isolated.  It is not
necessary for engineering to make any deep inquiry into other causes to be confident that
X causes Y and therefore recommend that if you want Y to change in a particular
direction, then change X.  However, in the case of a non-experimental science like
economics, inquiry into deep causes is necessary and in some sense never ending.  If X is
found to be the cause of Y, we can always ask what caused X and so on.
Positivist irrealism and the neglect of driving forces has led economists to overlook
some striking anomalies in the past. Consider the case of the effect of a price increase on
quantity demanded.  If the conjunction of a given price and quantity demanded is
invariant, then if the price returns to its previous level, the quantity demanded should also
return to its previous level.  Empirically, predictions of quantity demanded deduced from
the coefficients discovered on the upward price movement are often wrong.  Consumers
often learn and grow to like the substitute for the more costly good and do not return to
their old level of demand.  Rationality with fixed preferences is not the only possible
behavior that fits budget constraints and market clearing (Arrow). Path dependence also
occurs on the supply side. Investment in an immobile asset may become fixed in use even
if output prices decline such that the total cost is not recoverable (Johnson).   A 3
methodology aimed at generalized, timeless law-like relationships is inappropriate to a
world that is changing.  An adequate methodology must accommodate both learning and
path dependence.  The process of investment and disinvestment must be investigated and
the result cannot be deduced from the output price and cost relationships observed during
expansion.  The learning process must be investigated to get behind the surface
phenomena of consumer behavior.
The investigation of “deep causes” that go behind observable surface phenomena is
a major agenda item for Lawson.  The search for deep causes would not be necessary in
closed systems where reality stays put–no learning and human choices which change the
connections between things.  Lawson notes that even in the natural sciences there are few
connections of the type of “if X, then Y in general.”  The relationship holds only for the
experimental conditions arranged by the scientist.  Experiments act to close the system. 
This is sufficient to tease out many laws and to guide practical engineering.  Experiments
form the essence of natural science methodology.  Realism, constant conjunctions among
things, and experiments go together.  Lawson argues that there are reasons to believe that
constant conjunctions are few in social affairs, and economics is limited in
experimentation.  
Social systems are not closed.  Unlike a system of fixed gears, humans are capable
of changing the conjunctions among themselves and between themselves and objects
(valuations).  Institutions describe the relationship among people circumscribed by formal
rights and cultural habits.  The existing rules condition the perception and distribution of
opportunities.  And, at the same time, our perception of the connection leads us to try to
change these institutions.
How have economists tried to fit a methodology appropriate for closed systems to
what is mostly an open system?  Central to field theory in physics is the conservation
principle.  This principle allows for the identity of the system to be maintained even if
transformed (Mirowski, p. 272).  How is the system closed in consumption theory?  One
way is to postulate path independence.  Another way is to rule out the phenomenon of
regret.  But experience and empirical evidence suggest otherwise.
Motivation is a deep cause of human action, but essentially unobservable. 
Economists have always been deeply suspicious of what people say.  We suspect they
rationalize and state their ideals rather than what really controls actions.  But what are our
choices as scientists?  We can either assume a motivation (narrow self interest) or try to
make what we can out of what people say about themselves.  Herbert Simon urges us to
get out of our armchairs and talk to business people.  He critiques Becker’s explanation of
the increase in female participation in the work force.  Becker’s theory can only consider
that it must have been caused by a change in relative prices.  Simon imagines that it could
have been caused by a change in ideology and preference.  Shall we accept the dictum of
theory or shall we ask people?  Where will the greatest mistakes occur?
Just as motivation and regret gives meaning to surface events, so do institutions.
Boylan and O’Gorman (p.99) make the point as follows:
The action of agents “includes an indispensable reference to some
conceptual scheme or other.  For instance, the same behaviour, such as
handing over a signed cheque, can constitute different actions: in one
instant the agent is paying off a debt and in another he or she is4
defaulting on a payment.  Without the concepts of bank accounts, legal
contracts, purchasing in advance, etc. these actions cannot be properly
identified.”  
“Lawsonian economic realism embraces this essential interpretative
dimension of the actions of economic agents.  Thus Lawsonian realist
economists clearly acknowledge human agency as a causal power.”  
“If, for instance, the action of paying a debt by cheque could not exist
without the concept of a bank account, neither can it exist without a
banking system.  Social systems or structures as well as individual agents
have causal powers.  Individual agency presupposes social structures and
vice versa; neither can be reduced to the other.”  
Deep causes whether motivational or institutional can’t be seen in a production
function.  Some have argued that it is not worth studying institutions since economic
growth can be explained by a physical production function.  But this surely begs many
questions of what must be the case in human relationships for the physical factors to be
present at the right time and place.  We have learned to carefully specify production
inputs.  Hybrid corn is not the same as open-pollinated.  We have learned to carefully
specify the labor variable in a production function.  An hour of labor of a person with
technical training is different from an hour from an illiterate.  We are learning that we can’t
take the person hour applied to work as a given.  It depends on motivation and
monitoring.  The MVP of labor may even depend on the price it is paid (Stiglitz).  We
need not add technology or institutions to the physical production function, but any useful
analysis of development will want to know what factors condition the presence of
technology and the presence of motivated labor.  
Prices and quantities are surface phenomena which neoclassical economics has
been content to work with.  But it is not just money or exchange that make goods
commensurate.  It is the institutional choice of rules of property rights and their
distribution.  Change the rules and your change the money measure.  What a thing costs is
a function of whose opportunities have to be taken into account by a decision maker.
(Samuels and Schmid)
Even more fundamentally, price can affect demand and not just quantity
demanded. In social capital research we are interested in whether reducing the cost of
volunteering, via tax deduction for example, might increase the demand for volunteering
(the supplying of labor).  Our standard theory holds the preferences for goods constant,
but in fact reducing the cost of volunteering may change the value of the activity for the
volunteer.  The existence of paid blood providers can reduce the value of unpaid donors’
blood by providing an alternative source for those in need (Titmuss).  Without a search for
deep causes we could never understand this relationship.
Realism in Social Capital and Evolutionary Economics
Recent work on social capital and evolutionary economics provides an example of
how  being more conscious of methodological issues might affect the path of research..5
Both involve a more realistic reinterpretation of game theory. In standard prisoner’s
dilemma games and models of contribution toward the production of high exclusion cost
goods it is common, following Olson, to assume an isolated individual following a decision
rule of optimizing expected utility.  So no matter what the other person does, it is rational
to defect and not contribute (be a free rider).  In fact, empirical studies show that free
riding is common in large number situations.  But they also show considerable exceptions.
Models shape research agendas.  If we find a significant correlation between high
exclusion cost situations and free ridership, inquiry may stop there since it seems
consistent with theory.  But if you start with a more realistic observation that relationships
matter, it is more likely that we will inquire into the conditions where people appear to use
self-regarding optimization decision rules, and how they differ from conditions where
people appear to do something else. 
Grant and Thompson integrated producer decision making into an ecological
model of a common range (Hardin’s tragedy of the commons), where the Nash
equilibrium for each economic agent causes overgrazing, leading to ecosystem collapse.
Two decision strategies were compared. One presumes that decision-makers having
perfect knowledge optimize expected utility. The alternative decision rule mimics
Axelrod’s tit-for-tat (1984): start with a bias for cooperation, then do what your neighbor
did last time. Not surprisingly, the rule-following “do what your neighbor did last time”
allows the ecosystem and its economic decision makers to continue in a common use
pattern indefinitely, while optimization quickly drives the ecosystem into irrecoverable
disturbances and resource loss. Placing the prisoner’s dilemma into a more realistic
ecological context suggests at least two important lines for future research in economics.
First, as Axelrod noted, we can see the emergence of institutions as an
evolutionary phenomenon. However a nascent institution like “do what your neighbor did
last time” is initiated, groups that possess this institution will survive in some ecological
environments whereas groups that tend toward individual optimization will disperse or die.
This suggests that some norms are products of economic evolution. Their ‘rationality’
consists not in their consistency with individual optimization behavior, but in their capacity
to produce collective behavior that is both ecologically and economically sustainable over
time. Second, the example makes it clear that however they arise, norms like “do what
your neighbor did last time” must be reproduced from year to year, from generation to
generation, in order to be effective. Why do some groups adopt non-optimizing norms of
cooperation, while others do not? 
The most plausible answers to this question point toward social capital. Knack and
Keefer observe that countries with higher levels of trust have higher levels of economic
development.  The regression coefficient indicates that a ten-percentage-point rise in the
trust variable is associated with an increase in growth of four-fifths of a percentage point.  
But what underlies trust?  Trust is an act of exposing ones assets to the opportunistic
behavior of others.  Knack and Keefer have no measure of the frequency and quality of
such behavior.  They only have a reported agreement with the statement, “Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted.”  In any case, why do people
trust each other?  It might be because of the build up of experience other time.  It may be
behavior following a rule such as enter into cooperative agreements with kin.  Or it might
be because there is a genuine affinity of one person for another and you do not take
advantage of people you like.  The correlation between trust and development only6
scratches the surface.  It does not get at what experiences might be created to increase the
amount of trust.  It does not illuminate how one source of trust complements and
substitutes for another and thus the basic ingredients of economizing to produce a result. 
One may not need to understand where trust comes from to predict economic growth, but
I surely do if I want to encourage growth by building trust.
Much of the research that  must be done on social capital presents a
methodological challenge. The design of a questionnaire to discover motivation for a
goods movement illustrates the inescapable role of priors.  The movement may be
motivated by a combination of selfish advantage, sympathy or rule following.  Economists
are used to thinking in terms of a budget constraint, fixed preferences, and calculation.  So
why not ask people to distribute 100 points amongst the several motives noted above? 
This will elicit the importance of the various motives.  But the frame of the question
assumes that people are calculating utility maximization.  What if the mind does not
always work like that?  What if it just jumps from an image of a situation to a fitting
action?  Psychologists like to use Likert scales and frame their questions in terms of the
extent of agreement with a statement.  This does not impose a “budget constraint” but it
nevertheless also presumes calculation and conscious consideration of whatever list of
alternatives is presented.  In the face of difficulties in investigating deep causes, some
economists are content to just assume them. But why should putting words in people’s
mouths be preferable to trying to interpret what they say, even if shaped by what is asked?
The Role of Economics in Policy
Prediction has two different meanings.  One refers to predicting some future state
such as the size of GNP in 2000.  Another is an “if, then” proposition.  It predicts the size
(maybe direction) of GNP or some other more limited state if policy X is implemented.  Or
it predicts that the rate of change in GNP will be associated with X policy.  These are
likely to be conditional on the other variables being present or absent.  
Analysts who make policy suggestions are predicting in the second sense.  They
are not predicting that policy X will in fact be implemented, but if it were they would think
they were successful in their analysis if the predicted state generally occurred for a
particular time and place.  They might think that they were not altogether unsuccessful
even if the state did not occur, if the policy could be shown to have moved things in the
desired direction and the actual state would have been further from the mark if the policy
had not been adopted.  What policy gets adopted is a matter of the outcome of power
struggles among contending interests.  And, its impact depends on the interactive choices
of many people with different perceptions and interests.
Positivism and the models that it has generated have served this model of policy
analysis well, for models define quantitative “if-then” relationships that allow precise
predictions to be specified. But positivist policy analysts have not been curious about
whether and how these predictions themselves might alter the policy process, how they
might bias policy making toward norms of utility maximization, rather than altruistic or
cooperative norms like “do what your neighbor did last time.”
Turning toward deep causes is emancipatory (Lawson’s word) in that it expands
the policy agenda. Attention to deep cause shifts our focus from merely changing events
within structures to changing event possibilities by transforming institutions.  It is the
difference between just changing prices to changing preferences; the difference between7
reducing transaction costs and changing who is buyer and who is seller. It also provokes
inquiry into the reflexivity of economic policy analysis itself. In the world of positive
economics, analysts observe and model a closed system from the outside. In the real
world, policy analysts mold preferences, provoke learning, and reinforce certain interests
while weakening others. Surely this process of changing the very phenomena economic
policy analysis has been developed to describe deserves comment and criticism. 
But can economics be more than social criticism?  We can live with modesty in
prescribing institutions that will serve a particular interest. We are quite aware of
Boulding’s law of unintended consequences.  Things will happen that we did not predict.
We are comfortable with Lawson’s observation that emerging reality can be out of phase
with our experience of it and that can be out of phase with our intended choices of
institutions. We are comfortable with a great deal of randomness.  Richard Rorty gets our
attention when he argues that there is no place to stand outside of culture in order to
evaluate it, that all inquiry is situated and a matter of perspective, and that science makes
truth rather than simply discovers it.  Still, Lawson speaks of demi-regs–connections that
hold over some time and space.  These are enough to make us get up in the morning and
inquire into deep causes and then into causes behind that the next morning. As Lawson (p.
288) writes, the aim of economics can be the “formulation of effective responses, such as
alternative institutional structures, including relationships.”  Given this pragmatic
orientation to the discipline, a shining beacon is not needed to guide us in the contest with
others over whose interests are to be reflected in prevailing institutions and to judge the
weight of the evidence that a given policy would serve a particular interest (Solo). One
can be satisfied with some even cloudy sense of direction obtained by constantly emerging
understanding of transient patterns. We agree with Lawson (p. 289) that there is reason to
“preserve the intuition that human social history is both explicable and yet actively made.” 
It is our moral judgment that the world would be better off believing so even if we can’t
ever know if it is true.
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Philosophy of Science and Positivism: A Short History
by Paul B. Thompson
Philosophy of science emerged from general epistemology between 1880 and 1920. It
inherited a robust distinction between deductive and empirical knowledge. Deductive knowledge
consisted in logical and mathematical inferences and in the analysis of concepts or definitions.
Empirical knowledge involved the observation of phenomena, the formulation of factual claims,
and the validation of generalizations. Throughout the early history of epistemology rationalist
philosophers such as Descartes argued that only deduction could produce authentic knowledge.
Empiricist philosophers such as Locke argued that even definitions, concepts and inferential
patterns were learned through experience. Empiricists also argued that since deductive
implications are by their nature already contained in the premises from which they were deduced,
deduction did not represent an advance in knowledge. 
By the late 19
th century, this debate had cooled considerably. Philosophers were deeply
engaged in two projects. One was an exploration of the logical underpinnings of mathematics. The
other was an attempt to resolve the problem of induction, or the establishment of lawlike
generalizations from isolated generalizations. The idea that a prime source of error came from an
uncritical reliance on beliefs and claims that were actually meaninglessness error influenced both
projects. Propositions or theories could be meaningless on logical grounds if they implied
contradictory or paradoxical claims. They were thought meaningless on empirical grounds if they
implied the existence of an entity that did not exist. 
The logical positivists were a group of philosophers who argued that every claim
admissible as “true” or scientific” must be capable of verification through a process of logical test
and experiential observations. Claims that could not pass this test were claimed to lack meaning.
This philosophy placed science squarely in the tradition of epistemology. Scientists must be
content to make logically consistent claims about their data. Since data are derived from human
sensory experience, scientists are never in a position to make claims about the world as it might
exist beyond human experience. Thus the logical positivists arrived at the most influential tenet of
their position: the prohibition of “metaphysical” language (i.e. any language referring to things
beyond human experience).
Almost before it got started, logical positivism was abandoned. Philosophers who had
been intrigued with verificationism realized that the principle of verification was itself unverifiable.
It was itself a metaphysical claim and no theory that included it could consistently prohibit
metaphysical language. Philosophers of science attempted many solutions to this problem from
1930 to 1970, not without some progress. Yet logical positivism’s emphasis on procedures of
verification and prohibition of metaphysical language remain enormously influential among
working scientists, while few of the more sophisticated theoretical approaches appear to have
many followers outside the philosophy of science.
The main exception to this generalization is Sir Karl Popper’s falsificationism. Popper was
arguing for this idea at the height of logical positivism, but it did not become widely influential
until Carl Hempel synthesized what was most appealing about the positivist program with
Popper’s ideas on falification. Hempel argued that every  scientific explanation has a deductive
structure. Factual observation statements and theoretical generalizations form the explanans (e.g.10
premises) of an explanation. Together, these must deductively entail the explanadum—a
description of the phenomenon to be explained. 
Applied to a standard economic problem, we would say that the explanans contains both
the quantitative model and any data that had been collected to specify parameters or constants
within the model. Together these elements would entail certain factual allegations, such as
“Inflation increases,” or “Hog prices collapse.” What makes this approach scientific, according to
Popper and Hempel, is that if the factual allegation turns out to be false, the researcher has a basis
for revising the model. The logical rigor of the structure guarantees that the explanadum is true
when the explanans are true. So if the explanadum is false, at least one of the premises is false. If
one has been diligent in collecting data, the false premise must be somewhere in the covering
theoretical structure; in this case the econometric model.
Hempel’s achievement is referred to as the “covering law” model of scientific explanation
or “deductive-nomathetic” generalization. On one hand, Hempel was simply working out ideas
that were implicit in positivist philosophy. On the other hand, his approach was an enormous shift
in the way that scientific inference was construed. Formerly, philosophers and scientists had
understood the “hypothesis” —by all accounts the key element of empirical science—as the
conclusion of inquiry, resting on factual observations. The “problem of induction” is that the
logical link between factual observations and the kind of lawlike generalizations was obscure, and
subject to error. Hempel reoriented this approach so that the hypothesis appears in the theoretical
generalizations of the premises (or explanans), and a particular factual circumstance appears in
the explanadum.
From this point, it is a relatively straightforward move to see science as a form of inquiry
that is involved in hypothesis testing. If lawlike generalizations plus observed data logically entail
a claim that is known to be false, there must be a false statement somewhere in the explanans.
Since the data have been observed to be true, the most insecure part of the lawlike
generalizations—the “hypothesis”—is the most likely candidate for being false. The Hempel
model also introduced logical rigor into the idea of prediction. To say that the explanans predict
the explanadum is simply to say that the explanadum is a logical consequence of the explanans.
Experimental scientists used the covering law method by creating an experimental apparatus that,
if the theory were true, would produce a certain result. It was back to the drawing board when the
expected result did not occur. Historical data could also be used to see whether the result that did,
in fact, occur at some point in the past was the one that was logically entailed by a theory or
model. This also provides a basis for falsification and revision. Thus, prediction does not involve
future states of affairs in any fundamental way. Science, Popper claimed, proceeds by constructing
experiments that will subject hypotheses to rigorous tests of falsification. The hypothesis
combined with factual statements about empirical conditions “predicts” a certain state of affairs. If
that state of affairs fails to obtain, the hypothesis is falsified. Scientists go back to the drawing
board. 
Though nothing in philosophy is uncontested, falsificationism continues to be influential.
Most mainstream philosophers of science would defend the basic principles of covering law
models and falsification. However, there are important respects in which this approach does not
satisfy all the desiderata for a philosophy of science. First, though we can show that a given
hypothesis is false, and can make enormous progress through eliminating faulty competitors, we
cannot show definitively that any hypothesis is true. Second, the theory says nothing at all about
the process scientists use to propose hypotheses. It is thus a poor guide to distinguishing between
work done on the leading edge and routine industrial practices. A related third problem is that
scientists regard some elements of theory as very well established. Established theory is never11
subjected to falsification. The “hypothesis” being tested is thus a small part of the lawlike
generalizations in the explanans. We know that there are some lawlike generalizations are false
when the explanans are falsified. Yet we have no test to ensure that the false claims are in the
hypothesis, rather than generalizations that make up the body of established theory. So the
practice of science requires judgment on the part of scientists and a collective sense of which
elements in scientific theory are “established” and which are not. 
Popper was clearly aware of these results, and did not regard them as defects. He was
effectively arguing that certainty was an illicit goal for science. The period after Popper’s
contribution took up these problems, while generally accepting the covering law model and
falsification as an adequate account of prediction, explanation and experimental practice. From
roughly 1960 to 1990, scholars tried to develop an account of how scientists distinguish
established science from hypothesis. This was widely recognized to be a normative (though not
politically driven) distinction, hence by the 1960’s philosophers of science had given up the idea
that science could be “value free”. W.V.O. Quine developed an approach that stressed parsimony
and comprehensiveness. Thomas Kuhn and Michael Polanyi stressed cultural factors operating
within the world of science itself. Imre Lakatos has provided what many philosophers would
regard as the best defense of the integrity of scientific explanation and of the progressive
development of knowledge. Post-Popperian philosophy of science was eventually pushed to an
extreme position by cultural relativists and postmodernists who argued that the social authority of
science resided in its capacity to reinforce a given power distribution, rather than any
epistemological guarantee of certainty.
All these views from Descartes to Kuhn philosophy of science presuppose an
epistemological approach. Scientific theorizing and research are presumed to differ from ordinary,
non-scientific forms of learning and knowledge acquisition in virtue of the way that they employ
methods of data collection, logical and mathematical inference, and the rejection of hypotheses
through falsification. Scientific theories are, on this view, constructions of the mind. None of the
leading figures in 20
th century philosophy of science argued that scientific theories are descriptions
of reality. For a realist the key point is whether the mechanisms and forces that are posited in
theory do, in fact, control the course of events in the real world. And if they do exert control, they
must exist. A realist, in other words, moves immediately to questions about whether putative
mechanisms, be they divine, evolutionary, or equilibria, actually exist. For a positivist, what
counts is whether postulating such mechanisms is consistent with certain logical tests.
On the realist view, science differs from ordinary, non-scientific knowledge in being the
account that seems most likely to be true. This is decided through a process of offering competing
accounts and then subjecting them to a process of “fair causal comparison” that notes the relative
strengths and weaknesses of each, regarding unrealistic constructs as particularly problematic. It
is not clear how recent realism escapes the charge dogmatism, the circumstance that led to
positivist philosophy in the first place. The factors that make a given theoretical account plausible
or preferable would presumably have as much to do with the human mind as the external world.
And as postmodernists have said, appealing to ‘reality’ can be just another way of asserting
power.
The pragmatist philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, formulated a century ago, has
reemerged as a third way. For Peirce, “truth” is a hypothetical end point that would be reached if
the process of comparative analysis could be pursued without cost or limit. Of course, actually
existing science has costs and must reach closure. But scientists who regard their activity as
guided by the norm of convergence on reality will follow a set of rules for conducting and
reporting their research, as well as for critiquing the work of others. These rules will differ12
dramatically from the kind of strategic debates that would be generated by scientists trying only to
maintain positions of wealth or power. Pragmatists would distinguish  science from non-science
by appeal to its procedures of discourse and debate. Scientific discourse would not involve claims
or arguments strategically calculated to advance financial, ideological or personal interests. It
would take all competing explanations seriously. It would regard the competition between
theories as resolvable in the fullness of time, and would rely explicitly on value judgements to
justify temporary closure of debate in situations calling for immediate action.
Before concluding this whirlwind history, it is worth noting that since 1970 mainstream
philosophy of science has turned away from the problems in physics and astronomy that were the
focus of its early practitioners. Biologists had long expressed dissatisfaction with approaches to
scientific explanation that analyzed cause and effect in terms of the “if-then” connection of formal
logic. Evolutionary biology in particular did not take the simple causality of events to be
particularly interesting. As a discipline, biology was interested in the emergence of a pattern out
of a host of separate events that were, in themselves, causally unproblematic. However, biologists
wanted a non-teleological account of species and genetic evolution, one that did not depend upon
a plan or design imputed to nature. As principles of evolution and biological equilibria have
become clearer, philosophers have increasingly recognized that the basic pattern of explanation in
biology differs fundamentally from that of physics.
Where does economics fit in all this? Generally speaking, 20
th century philosophy of
science has been a debate about the philosophy of physics. Physics was thought to provide the
best example of scientific theory and experimental practice. Until recently, economics was thought
to be a deductive science: a discovery of the logical structure implicit within a limited set of
formally specified assumptions. John Stuart Mill had proposed this view of economics in 1836.
Mill’s starting assumption—a person guided only by self-interested maximization—was modified
over time to include assumptions about the logical structure of preferences, zero information costs
and the like. Yet even today many economists would insist that their discipline has little empirical
content. 
Mill believed that economics is applied in the same way that mathematics is applied. If you
are ordering carpet, it is handy to know some geometry. If you are running a business, it is handy
to know some economics. Neither geometry nor economics is explaining anything in either case.
In Mill’s view, the application of economic theory is an art requiring judgment to assess whether
and in what respects the formal assumptions of the theory are relevant to a practical case at hand.
This view shifted over time, especially in Lionel Robbins’ influential essay On the Nature and
Significance of Economic Science (1935). Robbins moved economics away from realism by
arguing that human psychology was irrelevant to economic science. What mattered was whether
observable economic behavior is consistent with the behavior entailed by assumptions specifying
the conduct of a rational economic agent. Although Robbins wrote before Popper and Hempel
became established names in philosophy of science, the model of economics that he described was
entirely consistent with the covering law and falsification approaches to scientific progress.
Post-Robbins, the view was that the rational actor model explains most human behavior,
so much so that it is possible to deduce unobservable preferences from economic choices
(something that Robbins himself would never have endorsed). This shift in the philosophy of
economics precipitated two contradictory developments. On the one hand, economics took on a
decidedly utilitarian look when the result of free and informed exchanges among individuals was
taken to represent the social optimum. On the other hand, the theory was said to be a purely
objective, value-free tool for predicting economic behavior. Milton Friedman linked the latter set
of claims with the word “positivism” in a famous article form 1953.13
It seems unlikely that economists can have their philosophy of science cake and eat it, too.
If the theory is value-free, economists should just shut-up about efficiency and losses. But
Robbins and Friedman style positivism has encountered deeper problems, as well. If “positive
economics” is interpreted in light of the covering law model of explanation, the basic assumptions
of economic theory would have to be combined with factual observations in order to generate
logically rigorous predictions. When predicted results turn out wrong, the theory should be
rejected and revised. But human behavior cannot be subjected to the controls needed to fix
background conditions and to eliminate extraneous influences. The theory could not, in practice,
be falsified because circumstances that were, from the point of the theory,
imperfections—information costs, inconsistency, ethical constraints—could not be eliminated
from the explanans. 
This resulted in a dilemma that continues to haunt economists. On the one hand, if one
stresses the behavioral orientation of the theory it can be understood as a program of falsification.
But the unrealistic elements of the assumptions limit both its testability and its applicability. On
the other hand, if one stresses the deductive validity of the formal theory, one can apply the theory
simply by arguing that human affairs should be restructured to more closely resemble the
conditions of individual optimization. This yields robust recommendations for practice, but shields
the substantive assumptions of the theory from criticism. 
Philosophy of science thus ends with what many might regard as disappointing results.
many practicing applied economists may with some justification find this convoluted history, even
abridged and summarized as it is, to be largely irrelevant to their research and teaching. Although
the situation might have been different a century ago, many scientists do not need to have any idea
what they are is actually doing in order to be successful. Science is now a socially established
institution, with socially reinforced rules and procedures. Perhaps these rules and procedures no
longer need a public rationale that would distinguish scientific claims from those of religion or
simple prejudice. While we believe that is a questionable assumption, it is not a topic that can be
pursued here. 
Today, the methods and procedures in which scientists are trained need not inspire any
more critical reflection than the catechisms of an earlier epoch. Understandably, most working
scientists do not want to be troubled by those who would question the underpinnings of a
discipline in which huge numbers of people and organizations participate in the use of established
methods for research and training of the next generation. One doesn’t get tenure for defending
science, only for doing it. As this set of papers attests, economists may be more willing to
participate in debate over foundations than many physical and biological scientists, but for the
most part one would expect the bench-economist to have about as much interest in philosophy
and methods as the average bench-scientist. That is, very little at all. 
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